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Abstract: John Stuart Mill’s harm principle maintains that adult behavior cannot
justifiably be subject to social coercion unless the behavior involves harm or a significant
risk of harm to non-consenting others. The absence of harms to others, however, is one of
the distinguishing features of many manifestations of “vices” such as the consumption of
alcohol, nicotine, recreational drugs, prostitution, pornography, and gambling. It is
therefore with respect to vice policy that the harm principle tends to be most constraining,
and some current vice controls, including prohibitions on prostitution and drug
possession, violate Mill’s precept. In the vice arena, we seem to be willing to accept
social interference with what Mill termed “self-regarding” behavior. Does consistency
then imply that any popular social intervention into private affairs is justifiable, that the
government has just as much right to outlaw skateboarding, or shag carpets, or spicy
foods, as it does to outlaw drugs? In this paper I argue that advances in neuroscience and
behavioral economics offer strong evidence that vices and other potentially addictive
goods or activities frequently involve less-than-rational choices, and hence are exempt
from the full force of the harm principle. As an alternative guide to vice policy, and
following some direction from Mill, I propose the “robustness principle”: public policy
towards addictive or vicious activities engaged in by adults should be robust with respect
to departures from full rationality. That is, policies should work pretty well if everyone is
completely rational, and policies should work pretty well even if many people are
occasionally (or frequently) irrational in their vice-related choices. The harm and
robustness principles cohere in many ways, but the robustness principle offers more
scope for policies that try to direct people “for their own good,” without opening the door
to tyrannical inroads upon self-regarding behavior.
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1. Introduction
Most nations tax alcoholic beverages more highly than other goods, and all
nations ban sales of some drugs. In Turkmenistan, opera is proscribed; in Uzbekistan,
billiards are banned.1 Are these regulations justifiable? To what extent can a government
legitimately regulate or prohibit goods or activities that it disfavors?
In his 1859 essay On Liberty, John Stuart Mill introduced a principle by which
such questions should be judged. Mill’s approach does not provide a recipe for desirable
policies; rather, Mill’s principle acts as a filter through which policies that unjustifiably
intrude upon individual liberty can be screened out. A regulation that meets Mill’s
criterion is not necessarily a good idea, but, if you accept his principle, a regulation that
fails the challenge represents an impermissible infringement upon personal freedom.
The filter that John Stuart Mill offered has achieved renown as the “harm
principle”:2
...the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
Social coercion (not just governmental coercion) exercised over you for your own well-
being, in the absence of “harm to others,” is a violation of your individual liberty. Mill
quickly offers the necessary child-excluding qualification, “that this doctrine is meant to
apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties.”3
2The harm principle tends to be particularly potent when it is applied to vices such
as the consumption of alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs; wagering; and prostitution and
pornography. The direct ill effects of vice generally are borne by the person who engages
in the vice. A person who drinks too much suffers the hangover himself. A person who
gambles too much loses money that is his or at least at the time of the loss is under his
control. This is not to say that the indirect effects of vice do not exact an enormous price
on intimates of alcoholics and pathological gamblers or victims of drunk drivers – clearly
their suffering is immense. But the direct effects of using alcohol, like those of using
ketchup, are primarily sustained by the consumer himself. There are important
exceptions; for instance, “second hand” smoke from cigarettes might damage the health
of proximate non-smokers, and drug use by pregnant women can harm their fetuses.
Nevertheless, for the most part vice is “self-regarding” behavior, to employ Mill’s
terminology, that does not directly damage specific others or the public at large. Controls
on adult vice, then, might well fall afoul of the harm principle.
Today, Mill’s harm principle presents something of a puzzle. It accords well with
many of the intuitions that are widely shared in liberal democracies.4 Under the harm
principle, for example, the government has no business regulating what color I paint my
living room, but society does have a legitimate interest in ensuring that my children are
protected against abuse and have access to education. The principle also coheres with a
standard economics approach to regulation (which is unsurprising as Mill authored the
text that dominated economics instruction during the latter half of the 19th century).
Government, according to this view, should intervene in activities among adults only in
3the presence of externalities.5 The costs and benefits of various actions that accrue
directly to the decision makers can best be weighed by the individuals in question. Only
external effects, those that are imposed on non-consenting others, provide a potential
rationale for social intrusion into individual choice in well-functioning markets.
So when it comes to ruling out bans on living rooms painted yellow or on opera,
we tend to side with the harm principle. At the same time, however, we might think that
prohibiting convenience-store sales of heroin (to adults as well as children) is appropriate.
The problem is that once we allow ourselves the heroin ban, we seem to open a door to
all sorts of intrusive regulations, including bans on billiards or opera, rock and roll or
yellow living rooms. As Mill asks, “...if mankind are justified in interfering with each
others’ liberty in things which do not concern the interests of others, on what principle is
it possible consistently to exclude these cases?”6
In other words, to reject the harm principle is to accept that sometimes we can
interfere with the self-regarding behavior of other adults. And then consistency might
require that we tolerate some tyrannous inroads upon our own liberties:7
...unless we are willing to adopt the logic of persecutors, and to say that
we may persecute others because we are right, and that they must not
persecute us because they are wrong, we must beware of admitting a
principle of which we should resent as a gross injustice the application to
ourselves.
One obvious way out of this dilemma is to employ the exceptions that Mill
himself identified. Maybe engaging in vice isn’t so self-regarding after all. Maybe our
preferred bans implicate externalities or kids in ways that the opera ban does not. Then
we can have our cake and eat it too: our preferred policies are justified through
4permissible but limited qualifications, while our continued allegiance to the harm
principle means that we needn’t be forced to accept that governments have the right to
dictate religious practices or living room decor.
For many forms of adult vice, however, the allowable exemptions for kids and
externalities can’t comfortably be stretched to allow coercive government policies.
Cocaine or heroin use per se, though often engendering significant harms to the user
himself, involves little in the way of harms to others. As Mill’s approach gives no
standing for “harms to self” as a primary motivation for regulations, attempts to coerce
adults away from cocaine or heroin consumption seem to violate the harm principle, even
with a generous interpretation given to Mill’s exemptions regarding kids and
externalities.8
But kids and externalities do not exhaust the qualifications to the harm principle.
Mill noted that adults can be coerced if they are “in some state of excitement or
absorption incompatible with the full use of the reflecting faculty…”9 This sort of
diminished rationality seems to be characteristic of decisions involving potentially
addictive substances or activities – as reflected in the frequent expressions of regret made
by individuals looking back at their previous alcohol, nicotine, or cocaine careers, for
example. The effects of drug taking and other addictive behaviors on the brain also
support the notion that vice decisions do not involve “the full use of the reflecting
faculty.”
Does the potential irrationality of vice-related choices imply that a ban on heroin
or cocaine can survive the application of the harm principle? Probably not. Vice was not
5unknown in Mill’s day, and he was explicit on the point that private indulgence in
alcohol, gambling, or prostitution, could not legitimately be suppressed under the harm
principle. In other words, Mill did not view his stated qualifications as sufficiently serious
to swallow his rule. Advances in neurochemistry and behavioral economics provide a
stronger case than was available in Mill’s time for the notion that adult vice decisions are
frequently less-than-fully-rational, but the consequences of such potential “irrationality”
(with which Mill was familiar) are not so assuredly detrimental that extreme compulsion
becomes justified. A provisional acceptance of the irrationality of some vice-related
decisions does not provide an open door for any and all varieties of coercive, paternalistic
policies. Vice-related degradation of the reflecting faculty does not exempt vice controls
from harm principle scrutiny.
Precisely how far can the door to vice control be opened in light of the potentially
irrationality of vice-related choices? Following the hints that Mill provided, I propose a
modified harm-type principle that should guide our approach to regulating vices that are
associated with seemingly irrational choices. My suggestion is that desirable vice
regulations should be consistent with a particular type of robustness: public policy
towards addictive or vicious activities engaged in by adults should be robust with respect
to departures from full rationality. That is, policies should work pretty well if everyone is
completely rational, and policies should work pretty well even if a substantial number of
folks are occasionally (or frequently) irrational in their vice-related choices. The first part
of the “robustness principle” rules out prohibitions of most private vice; the second part
rules out unfettered access to traditional vicious goods such as alcohol, tobacco, or
6cocaine. By this reckoning, high taxes, advertising restrictions, and subsidies to
prevention and treatment are all potentially legitimate vice policies. Our current drug
prohibitions, of course, do not meet this challenge.
Policy regimes that are consistent with the robustness principle offer a sort of
compromise with the self-control problems that tend to mark vicious decision making.
Vice regulations should provide some support for those who are striving to make good
choices, whether those people have been generally successful or unsuccessful in the past
in overcoming compulsive behavior. The trick is to provide such support without unduly
inconveniencing those who, at least for the time being, can achieve the virtue of
rationality (if not moderation) in dealing with temptation.10 One example of a policy that
satisfies the robustness principle is a requirement for purchases of heroin, say, to be made
with at least three days’ notice – where the notice would be revocable by the adult would-
be purchaser at any time during the ensuing waiting period. Rational heroin consumers,
and even rational addicts, can then assure themselves of a steady supply, but those
struggling with self-control issues will not be able to immediately satisfy an unforeseen
craving, and can cancel an impulsive order when their decision-making faculties are
controlled by their more-considered selves.
The robustness principle as applied to vice policy parallels more general
regulatory approaches that have been developed in recent contributions to behavioral law
and economics (see endnote 10). The “asymmetric paternalism” of Camerer et al. (2002),
for instance, is a precursor in advocating policies that offer aid to less-than-rational
people, while imposing at most small costs upon rational individuals. The advance
7purchase requirement for heroin suggested above is asymmetrically paternalistic;
mandatory disclosure of the risks of heroin use by sellers is another policy that meets the
robustness principle and is asymmetrically paternalistic. Moderate sin taxes (see
O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2003) likewise can satisfy robustness while being
asymmetrically paternalistic.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I look closely at the harm principle as
applied to vice regulation, and to drug policy in particular. What is perhaps most
surprising is the severity of controls that are consistent with a proper Millian regard for
individual liberty when externalities and protection of children are take into account, even
if adult vice-related decisions are accepted as fully rational. In section 3, I briefly review
some of the evidence linking addiction to disease as well as some recent work in
behavioral economics; following those reviews, I relax the full rationality assumption in
applying the harm principle, thereby allowing public policy to respond to the “harms to
self” connected with vice. But the appropriate extent to which policy can respond to
harms to self is limited, and I will examine Mill’s implicit guidance as to where those
limits might be. The robustness principle emerges from this exercise, in section 4. I then
compare, in section 5, the robustness principle with the (unrelaxed) harm principle in
terms of their implications for legitimate vice policies. The possibility for drug policy to
respond to harms to adult users available under (or even required by) the robustness
precept generally allows for some controls that would not be permissible under the harm
principle. Nevertheless, there is much agreement between the policy implications of the
8harm and robustness principles. In particular, prohibitions aimed at adult vice
consumption are inconsistent with both approaches. Section 6 offer conclusions.
2. The Harm Principle and Vice Policy
Simple to state, the harm principle has proven to be complex in application, an art
as much as a science. Mill’s concepts of self-regarding and other-regarding activities do
not draw clear, unambiguous lines between different behaviors.11 Nevertheless, the harm
principle certainly seems to rule out general prohibitions against adult indulgence in most
vices: there would be no such thing as an illegal drug, for instance, were a straightforward
interpretation of the harm principle the guiding force underlying our vice laws. Likewise,
prostitution and all other forms of consensual sex involving adults would not be criminal
matters. Drugs and sex could still be regulated, and perhaps even regulated quite strictly,
under the standard established by the harm principle, but the private use of drugs and
private exchanges for sex could not be forbidden to adults. Nor would stringent
regulations on vices be justifiable under the harm principle, if those regulations
approximated a total ban.
Mill provides fairly detailed guidance on the implications of his harm principle
for the control of alcohol, prostitution, and gambling. Nevertheless, definitive statements
(like those in the previous paragraph) about the incompatibility of an adult vice
prohibition with the harm principle would not be universally accepted. For example, the
harms to others that flow from drug use, along with Mill’s exception for children, could
be argued to provide sufficient scope to justify a heroin ban. In the remainder of section
92, I provide a more extensive justification for my proposed interpretation of the
ramifications that the harm principle holds for drug policy.
2.1 Kids
Children are widely regarded as being fit subjects for prohibitions against
consuming or producing vice, at least in the absence of parental supervision. There are
many tricky issues, such as identifying an appropriate minimum drinking age or age of
consent for sexual activities, but the conviction that the law can and should attempt to
shield children from unbridled vice is all but universally accepted. The difficulty for the
harm principle comes when regulations undertaken to further the interest of protecting
children from vice involve collateral restrictions on adults. 
If there are regulations short of prohibition for adults that can effectively and cost-
efficiently control the harm to children, then these regulations would be preferable to a
complete ban.12 Even if such efficacious controls are not available, a prohibition might be
unwise, if the ban does a poor job at reducing the use by children or reduces that use
while imposing other, possibly more significant, harms.
Maybe authorized adult access to recreational drugs, even if regulated, opens
channels that would not otherwise exist for making the drugs available to kids, and with
this availability comes significant harm. Drug policy expert John Kaplan thought so,
based in part on the experience with alcohol and tobacco, as he indicated in his influential
1988 article that argued against the legalization of hard drugs: “...legal access for adults
makes a drug de facto available to the young.”13  There are different degrees of
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availability, however. It is one thing for a drug to be available to older teenagers who
invest enormous resources in tracking it down. It is something else entirely if every junior
high school cafeteria table has its own supplier.
Even if the legal availability of a drug to adults implies some availability to
youths, the force of that implication in recommending a prohibition for adults depends on
the relative availability of the drug to the young under a regime of prohibition. It cannot
be taken for granted that drugs that are legal but regulated for adults will be more
available to kids than drugs that are prohibited. The access that teens have to a prohibited
drug depends upon many factors, including the extent of enforcement of the prohibition
and the fashionableness of the drug. Certainly various illicit drugs are readily available to
inner city youths; indeed, employment opportunities in the distribution chain of such
drugs also appear to be widely available to kids in the inner city. Many American
teenagers find it easier to acquire marijuana, a prohibited drug, than alcohol or cigarettes,
substances widely and legally available to adults, though prohibited for kids.14 (Nor do
kids appear to be commonly employed in the chain of distribution for alcohol.) The vast
majority of American high school seniors, inner-city or not, can expeditiously procure
pot. For each of the last thirty years, between 82 and 91 percent of twelfth-graders
surveyed as part of the Monitoring the Future project have indicated that marijuana is
either fairly easy or very easy to obtain.15 Further, the harmfulness of drug use by children
is not simply a function of the prevalence of that use. Prohibition might, for instance, lead
to less drug use (by both adults and kids) than in a legal, regulated market, but the
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potential to overdose might be higher under prohibition because the strength of a dose
would not be standardized.
Nevertheless, significant leakage of a drug to children from a legal adult market
combined with substantial harm from that leakage provides one rationale for a drug
prohibition, even for committed Millians. Note the use of the qualifier “significant,”
which indicates the extent to which application of the harm principle is a matter of
judgment. Given the evidence concerning marijuana (and other drug) availability and the
employment of young children in some sectors of the illegal drug trade, I generally do not
think that any marginal increase in availability to kids through leakage from a legal adult
market would be significant enough to justify, in itself, an adult prohibition of a
recreational drug – but others might legitimately disagree. One difficulty of making
categorical pronouncements here is that drug legalization would undoubtedly hold
different consequences for different kids. Those youths who live in neighborhoods where
drugs are already rife would probably see a decrease in drug availability through
legalization and regulation – for these kids, drugs are essentially unregulated under the
prohibition regime. For kids who live in neighborhoods without widespread drug
markets, however, it is possible, even likely, that some forms of legalization would lead
to increased availability.16
Another kid-related issue that holds implications for the regulation of drugs is that
adults who are addicted to hard drugs by and large do not make good parents. That is,
perhaps a legal adult market for a drug does not increase the use of the drug by kids, or
does increase use but with a lower level of overall harm to kids. Nevertheless, if such
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availability leads to child neglect on the part of parents, then adult drug use still involves
“harm to others” that might provide a second kid-based rationale for a prohibition. 
In On Liberty, Mill addressed this type of harm to others – the neglect of duties,
including parental duties, stemming from indulgence in a drug or another vice. If such
indulgence would necessarily or with a very significant probability lead to such neglect,
then a prohibition might be in order:17
...when a person disables himself, by conduct purely self-regarding, from
the performance of some definite duty incumbent on him to the public, he
is guilty of a social offence. No person ought to be punished simply for
being drunk; but a soldier or policeman should be punished for being
drunk on duty. Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a definite
risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken
out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of morality or law.
But if the risk of damage to others is not so immediate or immanent, then punishment
should be targeted at the infliction of damage, and not at the behavior that “caused” the
imposition of harm. A man whose profligacy leads to the destitution of his family can be
“justly punished,” whether his spending went to alcohol or “the most prudent investment”
– but the punishment is “for the breach of duty to his family or creditors, not for the
extravagance.”18
While child neglect is a bad thing, therefore, it does not serve as a Millian
rationale for a drug prohibition, unless any consumption of the drug as assuredly leads to
child neglect as being drunk on duty leads to severely diminished performance by a
police officer. Someone who had once neglected a duty through his indulgence in a vice,
however, could be prohibited from future indulgence, as Mill noted, without the
prohibition constituting an unacceptable limitation upon individual liberty.19 A parent
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who became neglectful or abusive under the influence of drugs or by a fixation on finding
and using drugs could face a drug prohibition targeted personally at him or her.20
Recall that Mill restricts the applicability of the harm principle to “human beings
in the maturity of their faculties.” Perhaps when it comes to making choices about drugs,
and particularly those choices that are made while under the influence of drugs, adults
share with children the feature of not being “in the maturity of their faculties.” When a
heroin addict wakes up in the morning, is his decision to go out in search of a fix the
decision of a fully reflective agent? Perhaps not – we will look more fully into the
rationality of vice-related choices in section 3. An easier case, though, arises when the
would-be purchaser is intoxicated. Mill makes it clear that coercion is permissible in this
situation: restraining someone who is already drunk from having another round or from
driving home is not a prima facie violation of the individual’s liberty, as the person is “in
some state of excitement or absorption incompatible with the full use of the reflecting
faculty…”21
2.2 The Ubiquity of Externalities
The notion that drug taking or some other vice might justly be prohibited if the
activity involves “definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or
to the public” is the source of another argument that attempts to reconcile the harm
principle with drug prohibition. The idea is to point to harm to others from drug use,
harm that is sufficiently likely and significant that an individual’s drug taking could not
be characterized as self-regarding activity. For such an approach to succeed in justifying
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prohibition under Mill’s standards, the external harms from drug use would have to
approximate those brought about by a drunk police officer – the potential (though quite
uncertain) harms of drug-induced neglect of familial duties would not be sufficient.
Social scientist James Q. Wilson adopts a version of the “significant harms-to-others”
approach:
John Stuart Mill, the father of modern libertarians, argued that people can
only restrict the freedom of another for their self-protection, and society
can exert power over its members against their will in order to prevent
harm to others. I think that the harm to others from drug legalization will
be greater than the harm – and it is a great harm – that now exists from
keeping these drugs illegal.22
For Wilson, an individual’s drug use apparently involves “definite damage, or a definite
risk of damage,” to the public, like that of a drunken cop. Wilson is not alone: “Today,
the harm principle is being used increasingly by conservatives who justify laws against
prostitution, pornography, public drinking, drugs, and loitering, as well as regulation of
homosexual and heterosexual conduct, on the basis of harm to others.”23
Just about any activity that harms the person engaging in it also harms those who
are attached to that person, as Mill recognizes: “I fully admit that the mischief which a
person does to himself may seriously affect, both through their sympathies and their
interests, those nearly connected with him and, in a minor degree, society at large.”24 One
family member’s addiction to alcohol, drugs, or gambling frequently throws a household
into misery. At the societal level, insurance involves the pooling of risks, so a person who
takes actions that make it more likely he or she will collect insurance payments harms the
other members of the risk pool.25 Similarly, public subsidies to medical care imply that
15
the ill health of many drug addicts imposes a cost upon the rest of society. Pathological
gambling can increase the rate of bankruptcy and drive up borrowing costs for everyone.
We have previously seen that Mill would permit the punishment of those who
violate family and societal duties through their vicious activity, or through any other
cause. But the harm principle would not countenance prohibiting an activity simply
because a small percentage of those who engage in it will subsequently violate such
duties. Further, minimizing the potential to require publicly subsidized health care is not
an obligation that society can legitimately impose upon individuals, without opening the
way to regulation of the minutest aspects of our activity, from what we eat to how much
we exercise to what time we go to bed to how we spend our leisure hours.26 Nevertheless,
it would probably not be an invasion of individual liberty to require private insurance for
individuals who choose to engage in exceptionally risky ventures, those activities that
involve a very significant risk of claiming societal resources. Mountain climbers, intent
upon scaling a peak that frequently has required expensive rescues of previous would-be
climbers, might have to post a bond in advance to pay for the rescue services that they,
too, might require.
When the risk of damage to the interests of others is sufficiently large, as in the
case of the drunken police officer, society can try to use the law to prevent harm. Without
an ample risk of harm to others, however, the criminal law is an inappropriate tool for
regulating vice. How certain is “harm to others” from occasional indulgence in a vice?
Typically, rather uncertain –  most drug users and most gamblers indulge in ways that are
not particularly problematic for even their close friends and relations. Even for cocaine
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and crack cocaine, drugs that are strongly reinforcing, only a small percentage of people –
less than ten percent, and perhaps as little as one percent – who use these substances
develop into habitual users.27 In the US, where the vast majority of adults have gambled,
about 1.2 percent can be classified as pathological gamblers.28 While external costs from
addiction are high, then, these costs are insufficiently certain to arise from experimental
or occasional indulgence to justify criminalization of drugs or gambling.
But with regard to the merely contingent or, as it may be called,
constructive injury which a person causes to society by conduct which
neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible
hurt to any assignable individual except himself, the inconvenience is one
which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human
freedom.29
Again, to justify the use of coercion, Mill’s explication of the harm principle
requires that conduct breach a specific public duty or directly and perceptibly harm some
“assignable” individual. Would-be prohibitionists cannot simply assert that they are
harmed by the conduct of others: there must be some perceptible harm:
There are many who consider as an injury to themselves any conduct
which they have a distaste for, and resent it as an outrage to their feelings;
as a religious bigot, when charged with disregarding the religious feelings
of others, has been known to retort that they disregard his feelings by
persisting in their abominable worship or creed. But there is no parity
between the feeling of a person for his own opinion and the feeling of
another who is offended at his holding it, no more than between the desire
of a thief to take a purse and the desire of the right owner to keep it.30
Mill indicates that in the case of alcohol, prohibition is a violation of the harm
principle. In particular, he attacks the “Maine Laws,” state-level prohibitions on alcohol
that were current in the mid-19th Century United States and were in some danger of
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being exported to England.31 This suggests that Mill would also view the harm principle
as filtering out prohibitions on sales of other drugs to adults. A more careful examination
of the external harms of drug use might nonetheless be called for before we can apply the
harm principle with confidence to drug regulation.  
2.3 External Costs of Drug Use
Drug researcher Mark Kleiman offers one potential accounting of “harms to
others” associated with drug use: dereliction of duty; crime; nuisance; health damage;
drain on common resources; risk-spreading and cross subsidy effects; leading others to
use drugs (in epidemiological fashion); and notional damage.32 (Notional damage is the
possibility that some people are made unhappy or disgusted simply by knowledge of
others’ drug use.33)
Note that Kleiman’s list of potential external effects of drug use consists of those
effects associated with drug use per se, independent of the policy regime. Many of the
costs commonly associated with drugs, however, are primarily artifacts of the existing
regulatory structure, including the drive-by shootings and the bulk of the fatal overdoses.
Under the influence of some drugs – alcohol is the preeminent example, but cocaine and
PCP would also qualify – people might be more likely to commit violent crimes, though
even this tendency involves the social setting and many factors beyond the drug’s
chemical properties.34 (Those under the influence of nicotine, opiates, or marijuana do not
appear to be increasingly predisposed towards violence, although in the past, these drugs,
too, have been thought to be violence-inducing.) With the particularly notable exception
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of alcohol, however, the perceived relationship between drug use and crime is primarily a
side effect of prohibition.
Consider Kleiman’s first three external costs, dereliction of duty, crime, and
public nuisance. We have already seen that the harm principle does not prevent police
officers and soldiers from being punished for being drunk on duty, because their
inebriation presents a definite risk of damage to the public. More generally, dereliction of
duty (such as failure to provide for children) could be punished, whatever the cause. But
the potential for drug taking to lead to this outcome is not sufficiently direct and certain
to justify making drugs illegal. Likewise, the crime that is engendered by some types of
drug consumption – violence by drunks, for instance – is not sufficiently direct and
certain to stand as a basis for outlawing drugs. The external harm that arises from creating
a public nuisance, like the harms from dereliction of duty or drug-induced crime, could
provide a reason to punish those who create public nuisances. Again, however, the public
nuisance associated with some drug use is insufficiently direct and certain to justify drug
prohibitions (though some less stringent regulations aimed at minimizing nuisance would
not unduly restrain the liberty of drug consumers.) If a person had once been violent
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, however, then a prohibition specific to that
person would be appropriate, for some period of time.
When the health of others is damaged by an individual’s drug taking, as by
second-hand smoke, then legal controls potentially are warranted. Whether the actual
damage to health caused by second hand smoke (or similar remote health effects from
other drug use) is sufficiently direct or certain, given current evidence, is less clear;
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certainly the extent of exposure matters, and would make intervention more justified in
those places where non-smokers are involuntarily subjected to frequent exposure of
relatively high concentrations.35 Where such effects exist, regulations are not inconsistent
with the harm principle – though the regulations should not be more restrictive of
individual choice to use drugs than is necessary to prevent the negative external health
consequences.36
Kleiman’s remaining types of external costs (drains on common resources, risk-
spreading and cross subsidy effects, leading others to use drugs, or “notional” damage) do
not rise to the Millian level to justify prohibition: such costs generally do not breach a
public duty, nor constitute “perceptible hurt to any assignable individual.”37
So, the interpretation offered here of Mill’s approach does not provide all that
much scope for legislation overriding the personal liberty of adults to engage in vice –
even when accounting for the kids and externality exceptions. While some strict controls
are consistent with the harm principle, channels for legal adult consumption of
recreational drugs must remain open, from Mill’s point of view. Table 1 offers a
summary of the implications of Mill’s harm principle for drug policy.
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Table 1: John Stuart Mill as Drug Czar: A Capsule Summary of Drug Policy Screened
Through the Harm Principle38
Prohibitions of manufacture or possession: These would not be allowed for any drug
that offered even the remotest hope of benefitting (or failing to damage) someone.39
Individuals who had previously harmed others while intoxicated, however, could be
subject to a specific prohibition. Kids could be prohibited from using drugs. Further,
those “doped up” at the time of attempted purchase could justly be refused service, just as
bartenders can refuse to serve intoxicated customers, on the grounds that such patrons are
“in some state of excitement or absorption incompatible with the full use of the reflecting
faculty…”40
Prohibitions on sales: If sellers are “indispensably required” for legitimate use of the
drug, then prohibitions upon sales are unallowable infringements on liberty.41 The Maine
laws or national alcohol Prohibition in the US, which outlawed sales but not purchases or
consumption of alcohol, were inconsistent with individual liberty – Mill believed that in
the case of alcohol legal sales were a near necessity for consumption. But in general,
prohibitions on sales are a close call. Buying and selling is a public act, and hence not a
species of self-regarding conduct. Trade can be prohibited without violating individual
liberty, as long as there readily exist alternative channels through which consumers could
acquire their drugs.
Regulations (short of prohibition) on sale: Many controls are allowable and potentially
desirable, including requirements of warning labels, registration of sales for the purpose
of crime control, sanitary or worker safety regulations, licensing of sellers, and opening
hours restrictions. Limiting the number of sellers simply as a means to discourage
consumption (as opposed to being an aid in enforcing other regulations) is an
infringement upon the liberty of potential purchasers, however.42
Prohibitions or regulation of advertising: Such restrictions on sellers, who have a
pecuniary interest in intemperance, may be justified. But private individuals can freely
advise or induce others to use drugs.43
Special taxation: This is not justified if the goal of the taxation is to reduce
consumption.44 If the goal is the collection of necessary government revenue, however,
then drugs could and should be taxed, up to the point of maximum revenue collection.45
Prescription-only regimes: To make drugs available only by prescription generally
cannot be countenanced, as a prescription regime places too great a burden upon those
who have legitimate, including recreational, uses for the drugs.46 Some “non-recreational”
drugs involve externalities that might justify a prescription regime, however. In
particular, antibiotic use harms others by contributing to the build-up of resistant strains
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of pathogens; so, antibiotics could be subject to a prescription regime as a means of
countering socially excessive use.
License requirements for legal purchase or use: If the conditions for qualifying for a
license are that the buyer or user indicate he or she understands the risks involved in
consumption, or conditions that might aid in the enforcement of other legitimate
regulations, then such a licensing system would not fall afoul of the harm principle. But a
licensing system for adult buyers could not be adopted simply as a means of reducing
consumption.
Regulating intoxicated behavior: Prohibiting an intoxicated person from engaging in
certain types of activity (such as driving under the influence) is not a violation of
individual liberty, if the behavior presents a definite risk of harm to others. Public
intoxication might justifiably be regulated – Mill notes that many acts that are not
harmful in themselves can nevertheless be restricted in public manifestations.47 Private
intoxication, however, cannot be prohibited.
3. Addiction, Disease, and the “Excitement” Exception
Accepting the harm principle, then, makes it hard or impossible to defend bans on
adult vice, such as our current drug prohibitions. But why accept the harm principle?
Despite the general accord of the harm principle with the tenets of liberal democracies,
Mill’s approach has never attracted anything like unanimous consent. You don’t have to
look too hard to find denunciations of Mill’s harm principle among vice policy experts.
John Kaplan again:
No nation in the world follows [Mill’s] rule regarding self-harming
conduct, and the rule is probably unworkable in a complex, industrial
society – particularly one that is a welfare state. Mill’s principle,
moreover, seems singularly inappropriate when it is applied to a habit-
forming, psychoactive drug that alters the user’s perspective as to
postponement of gratification and his desire for the drug itself.48
Or this, from James Bakalar and Lester Grinspoon: 
22
When Mill wrote On Liberty, absolute freedom of trade still seemed
defensible; the disease concept of drug abuse was only an opinion, not an
institution; and the medical profession and medical science were relatively
feeble. We will never return to the social and intellectual conditions that
made possible Mill’s opposition to all drug laws.49
Earlier in the same book from which the previous quote is drawn, Bakalar and Grinspoon
suggested that today people “are much less inclined than Mill to treat drug use as the free,
rational act of an autonomous person.”50
The notion that habitual drug use is irrational or that addiction is a disease offers
an exception to the harm principle, by making the addict out to be someone not in the
maturity of his faculties, or without the full use of the reflecting mechanism. But is
addiction a disease? 
3.1 A Disease View of Addiction
Neurobiological factors play a key role in much drug use. The reward structure of
our brains (and of animal brains) provides a motive towards behavior that is generally
beneficial for the individual (or his or her genes), activities such as eating, drinking, and
sex. One main channel for reward in humans is dopamine neurotransmission within a part
of the brain known as the medial forebrain bundle.51 Addictive drugs, including alcohol
and nicotine, have differing and complex effects on brain chemistry, but they all stimulate
the dopamine reward mechanisms – despite being unconnected to the beneficial behavior
that the reward system developed to motivate. In all likelihood, it is this stimulation that
makes drug use so reinforcing. “[A]ddiction results when the reward system of the brain
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is hijacked by chemical substances that played no role in its evolution.”52 In other words,
drug addiction can be viewed as a disease, an unhealthy physical condition.
Much of the evidence concerning the effect of drugs on the brain, and thereby on
behavior, is drawn from studies on animals. Addiction does not seem to occur to non-
human animals in the wild.53 In experimental settings, however, animals can be induced
to press a bar repeatedly for a reward of a drug like cocaine, to the exclusion of all else.
(They can be induced similarly to push a bar when pushing results in a direct electronic
stimulus to the reward area of their brain.) “[A] monkey will self-administer [cocaine] to
exhaustion – not eating, not drinking, and ignoring opportunities for sexual activity.
Eventually, such a monkey will die taking cocaine – of starvation or dehydration or
sudden heart stoppage caused by the drug excess in the body.”54
The “short-term benefit, long-term cost” nature of drug use also is reflected in
brain chemistry. Acute administration of a drug produces the brain reward noted above.
Repeated drug use, however, tends to cause “homeostatic” adjustments in the brain. The
excessive dopamine presence created by the drug use leads the brain’s own reward
circuitry to become degraded in various ways. One result, apparently, is tolerance and
withdrawal symptoms. More of the drug is needed to achieve the same hedonic effect,
and the absence of the drug leads to unpleasant feelings, anhedonia. These longer term
effects on brain chemistry from drug use, of course, can themselves reinforce the desire to
use the drug.
This brief description of the neurobiology of drug use is hopelessly
oversimplified. The precise mechanisms through which drugs affect the brain are
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multifarious, and to some extent remain unknown. For example, the central role played in
addiction and relapse behavior by cravings induced by environmental cues suggests that
drugs influence the part of our brain that forecasts how much we will enjoy some activity,
and not just the brain region that provides the reward during consumption.55 Within-
session effects can be different from both acute and chronic impacts; for instance, an
initial dose of cocaine might lead to sensitization, where the closely following dose has a
larger, not a smaller impact, than the first dose.56 Nevertheless, the general brain reward
mechanism seems to be a key element in reactions to most addictive drugs.57 Amazingly,
behavioral addictions such as pathological gambling involve brain chemistry in ways that
are not dissimilar from those of drug addiction.58
The disease view of addiction lends itself to understanding drug use as an act
initiated by a patient, a victim of disease, to medicate his affliction. Some people have a
brain reward system that is relatively underdeveloped, so the “artificial” stimulation of
drugs or gambling might be needed for their brains to function “normally.” This view is
particularly compelling in the case of opiate addiction because there are some naturally
produced opiate-like substances, endorphins (from “endogenous morphines”) , in the
brain. Someone with “too few” endorphins might rationally treat his condition by
ingesting morphine, heroin, or some other opioid. For such a person, narcotics use could
compensate for his inborn deficiency, just as diabetics rely on insulin injections to make
up for their own natural shortcoming. By these lights, both junkies and diabetics use
drugs to become “normal.”59 Users of non-opiate drugs likewise might be compensating
for a neurobiological condition, a substandard dopamine neurtotransmission system. This
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condition has been termed “reward deficiency syndrome.”60 For those individuals with
reward deficiency syndrome, drug use might not be a free choice, much less a rational
choice.
The degradation of the brain’s own reward circuitry that follows heavy drug use
implies that even people who cannot initially be characterized as exhibiting reward
deficiency syndrome end up suffering from a form of that condition. They start out as
“normal,” but they experiment with a drug, and they really enjoy it. They naturally seek
to repeat that pleasurable experience, by taking the drug again – and again, and again.
Homeostatic adjustments within their brain then begin to kick in, so that their “baseline”
level of pleasure is degraded. Eventually, taking the drug still provides a pleasure boost,
but because their baseline has shifted, the drug only makes them feel normal, the way
they felt without any stimulus prior to their addiction. Potentially addictive drugs or
activities are a trap: a known trap but nonetheless a subtle one.61
3.2 Dynamic Inconsistency and Addiction
Recent advances in behavioral economics also call into question the extent to
which adult vice-related choices are optimal, even from the point of view of the decision
maker. The short-term benefit, long-term cost nature of much drug use, for example,
might lead to impulsive decisions eventually followed by regret. Rational individuals
might discount delayed costs differently as time passes – that is, rational behavior does
not require “time consistency.” Someone whose preferences display time consistency
would be able to plan future behavior today (contingent, perhaps, on such things as future
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prices), and would stick by that plan in the future. Someone with time inconsistent
preferences, alternatively, might develop an optimal plan today, but decide not to follow
the plan tomorrow. What the person now thinks will be his best choice one year from
now, will, when the year has passed, no longer appear to be his best choice – even if
neither improved information nor additional options become available.
There is substantial evidence that individual choices are not time consistent.62
Further, departures from dynamic consistency are rather systematic, not random, and
apply widely. People tend to be more impatient when making decisions concerning the
present and near future than when they make decisions concerning the more distant
future. Would you rather have $1000 today or $1075 in one week? Many people would
prefer the immediate $1000. What if, instead, the choice were between $1000 to be
received precisely 227 days from today, or $1075 to be received precisely 234 days from
today? In this case, many people would choose (today) to wait the extra week (in 227
day’s time) for the additional $75. People are typically less willing to postpone gains in
the present than they are when making decisions about the future. Note that, when 227
days go by, and people are then asked to choose between an immediate $1000 or $1075
in one week, these same people will presumably revert to preferring the immediate $1000
– they would not want to follow the plan they viewed as optimal 227 days earlier. This is
the sense in which their choices do not display time consistency.
Regret is one of the markers of dynamic inconsistency, and one that appears to be
particularly connected with decisions that involve current pleasures paired with future
costs. Many people regret overspending or saving too little money, for instance. (The
27
source of the word “addict” is the Latin word “addictus,” which in ancient Rome referred
to those imprudent or unfortunate souls whose excessive debts led to their being enslaved
to their creditors under judicial order.) Such people tend to view their previous decisions
as short-sighted, which is not to say that these people will become more forward-looking
in the future. It is as if we are two people, a prudent Dr. Jekyll and an intemperate Mr.
Hyde, but it is our capricious, imprudent self who is making our current decisions as to
whether or not to have a beer, play a video game, or pick up smoking. Looking back as
Dr. Jekyll, we regret Mr. Hyde’s previous choices.
That dynamic inconsistency is at least part of the issue with addiction is lent
credence by the fact that many addicts seem to engage in a contest for self-control, a
struggle between the desire for the drug and the desire to quit.63 Addicts frequently
describe their predicament in precisely these terms, as if they were two separate people
battling for dominance of the decision-making power. Sometimes people invest in
various sorts of self-control devices, designed to lower the payoff from future indulgence
– investments that are hard to square with the notion that vicious choices are fully rational
and time consistent.64
Dynamic inconsistency could greatly alter the appropriate policy towards drugs or
other potentially addictive goods, even if it is accepted that users are rational.65 As
individuals themselves are comprised of time-specific entities who have different
preferences, “harm to others” could be construed to include “harm to your future self” –
harm that you will not fully take into account, because your future self will have different
preferences than your current view of that person’s preferences. “Internalities” is the term
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applied to these “internal externalities.”66 Personal rules that help us to precommit to low
consumption of a potentially addictive good or otherwise fortify our self-control are one
common method adopted to give our future selves their due. 
Public policies, like personal policies, might want to respond to the internalities
that arise when a person’s “current” self imposes costs on his or her “future” self; that is,
the government might be in a position to help Dr. Jekyll control Mr. Hyde.67 Taxes are
one lever by which government can reduce consumption of targeted goods. In the case of
cigarettes, to fully induce current consumers to take into account the costs they impose on
their otherwise under-represented future selves, it has been estimated that an additional
tax of $1 per pack of cigarettes might be justified.68 If the measure of happiness is a
person’s long-run preferences (i.e., Dr. Jekyll’s preferences), such a tax can contribute to
a smoker’s happiness – a startling revision of the standard economics notion that a
consumer cannot be made better off when the price rises for a good she already
purchases.69
4. The Robustness Principle
Recall that John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, as interpreted in Table 1, is
consistent with extensive regulation of addictive substances and activities. About the only
types of regulation that the harm principle surely rules out are prohibition of possession or
use backed by criminal penalties, and making substances available by prescription only.
The nature of addiction does not altogether negate the force of the harm principle:
decisions concerning potentially addictive substances and activities generally cannot be
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said to be insane or irrational. At the same time, however, addiction shares many features
of disease, so choices by addicts legitimately can be classified as being made in a state
that is not consistent “with the full use of the reflecting faculty.” Social coercion of such
decisions, then, does not run afoul of the harm principle.
Most vice-related decisions appear to be both rational and self-regarding. Many
others are not fully rational, or implicate dynamic inconsistency. Mill’s harm principle
would allow social intervention with respect to the irrational decisions, but generally it is
not possible to know which choices are rational, and which are irrational. It isn’t even
clear when someone’s consumption of a drug or an activity crosses the line from
“occasional” or “controlled” to “habitual” or “compulsive.”
Once we accept that many choices with respect to potentially addictive goods are
not fully rational – or at least that there is a strong case to be made that such choices are
not fully rational – are we then left with nothing, no principle that could limit the most
extreme coercive measures from being applied to vice choices? No, and Mill himself
provides the way, in his discussion of commodities that can be used both for beneficial
purposes and for the purpose of committing crimes. With respect to poisons or similar
dual-use articles, Mill endorses regulations that aid in deterring the nefarious use, while
not being too burdensome upon those consumers with innocent intent. “Such regulations
would in general be no material impediment to obtaining the article, but a very
considerable one to making an improper use of it without detection.”70 We saw a similar
balancing act applied to Mill’s condemnation of prescription-only systems: the
requirement of having to first obtain permission from a licensed physician is too onerous
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a burden to impose upon drug consumers, even though such a requirement would help
insulate some problematic users from drug use.
That some adult vice-related consumption is less-than-rational, and that we cannot
easily distinguish rational from irrational choice with respect to vice, suggests that we
forge a compromise when constructing public policy – as Mill argued with respect to the
sale of dangerous goods. Vice regulations should provide some support for those who are
struggling with self-control in their decision-making. The provision of such support
should not impose substantial costs upon those whose vice-related decisions are marked
by rationality.
This leads us to the robustness principle, as described in the introduction. Public
policy towards potentially addictive activities should be robust with respect to departures
from full rationality. Vice policy for adults should hold up pretty well if everyone is
always fully rational, and it should work well, too, even if some or many vice-related
choices are irrational. We require this robustness precisely because we cannot easily
ascertain how much vice is rational, nor distinguish the rational component from that
which flows from a degradation of the reflecting faculties.
The robustness principle, then, has been fashioned by combining the harm
principle with (1) the notion that vice-related choices are particularly likely to fall short of
full rationality and (2) the Millian idea that regulations aimed at harmful activities should
not impose large costs upon their non-harmful counterparts. In the next section, I will
look at the implications that the robustness principle holds for drug policy.
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5. Drug Regulation Under the Robustness Principle
The main difference between the robustness principle and the harm principle with
respect to their ramifications for vice policy is that the robustness principle allows for
regulations to be aimed directly at reducing harms to vice consumers themselves. Indeed,
the robustness principle might require such regulations, on the grounds that their absence
could result in a regulatory regime that is woefully ineffective in the face of widespread
vice-related self-control problems. To aid the comparison between the harm and
robustness principles, the discussion here will be restricted to drug policy. 
Consider again Table 1. The strictest controls – most particularly, prohibition of
drug possession – are as incompatible with the robustness principle as they are with the
harm principle, because such strict controls fare poorly when applied to rational drug
consumers. The differences between the principles are made manifest in those
circumstances where Mill specifically rules out policies that are intended to restrict drug
consumption. These areas include regulations upon sellers; taxation; and licensing
requirements for legal purchase. In all of these policy realms, Mill would permit controls
that serve other legitimate ends, even if those controls have the collateral effect of making
it harder for people to consume drugs. He would not accept these measures, however, if
they were aimed directly at reducing drug use.
The robustness principle, alternatively, would permit the adoption of some
controls designed solely to reduce adult drug use. Limiting the number of sellers (or their
hours of operation) to render it somewhat inconvenient to procure drugs impulsively,
therefore, is permissible under the robustness principle – as long as the restrictions do not
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become significantly burdensome for those whose drug consumption choices are fully
considered. Similarly, buyer licensing (or some other hurdle to drug availability) would
not run afoul of the robustness principle, even if the licensing had no other purpose than
to reduce harms to drug users themselves by rendering procurement more arduous. Sin
taxes, for Mill, are constrained to be no higher than the revenue-maximizing level. For
robustness purposes, such taxes are limited by the burden that they place upon rational
consumers. This limit could exceed or fall short of the revenue-maximizing exaction.
For further illustration, let’s look at the possibilities for regulating heroin under
the robustness principle. Heroin use can be immensely dangerous; nevertheless, the use of
heroin involves little direct harm to others. (That is, doped-up heroin fiends do not
typically go on crime sprees induced by heroin’s pharmacological properties. Heroin is a
narcotic, a drug that tends to induce listlessness, not violence, though individual
responses to heroin vary widely.71) How strict can the heroin regulatory regime be made
without violating the robustness principle? 
First, kids could be prohibited from purchasing or possessing heroin, and anyone
could be prohibited from selling or otherwise transferring heroin to underage consumers.
But if this prohibition is no more effective than current prohibitions on kid purchases of
alcohol and cigarettes, then too many kids will be using heroin.72 So, as under the harm
principle, we must invoke collateral regulations on adults to reduce the porousness of the
ban on youth access to heroin. In particular, adults could face a quantity restriction on
how much heroin they can purchase (each month, say). The purpose of this quantity
restriction is not to reduce adult consumption, but rather, to prevent a lone rogue adult
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from supplying heroin to an entire high school. That is, quantity restrictions for adults can
be adopted to help police the black market for youth (or ineligible adult) access.
Similarly, purchases could be required to be arranged in advance, or sales could be made
only through mail-order, so that the heroin equivalent of teenagers waiting outside the
convenience store to pay an adult to buy them a six-pack of beer would be foreclosed.
The robustness principle (unlike the harm principle) allows us to go beyond those
quantity limits and advance-purchase requirements that help to shield teens from adult
drug access. Further quantity limitations – that is, quotas more restrictive than those that
would “optimally” preclude youth access – could be adopted, as a way of restricting adult
usage. These quotas could not be so tight, however, as to render it difficult for a rational
adult addict to maintain himself in his addiction: quotas that significantly restrict adult
addicts would run afoul of the robustness principle, for being too costly upon rational
consumers. Similarly, using the robustness standard, there is further scope for advance
purchase requirements – that is, requirements that go beyond what is needed to police the
black market. Even prolonged advance purchase mandates do not impose significant
burdens upon considered use. A month-in-advance purchase regulation would probably
meet the robustness principle, even if it offered no more of a barrier to black market
acquisition than a 24-hour requirement. 
To implement the quantity restrictions, there must be a method to identify
consumers and to keep track of their purchases. Adults would need some sort of credit
card-like identification that can record their purchases and check the quantity of
purchases against a database. Do all adults automatically qualify for such a card, which is
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essentially a license to purchase limited amounts of heroin, or are there special conditions
that must be met before someone is deemed eligible for a drug license? 
In the terminology of Mark Kleiman, the issue is whether the authorization to
purchase comes in the form of a “negative license” or a “positive license.”73 A negative
license is one that is automatically available to all adults; however, someone who creates
a public nuisance, drives a car recklessly, or commits another crime under the influence
of heroin, or who diverts the heroin to youths, or in any way imposes harms on others
through heroin use or distribution, could then have his or her heroin license revoked. In
other words, with negative licensing, socially destructive behavior connected with heroin
use would result in a prohibition specific to the wrongdoer – a policy that, as we have
seen, also is consistent with Mill’s application of his harm principle. 
A positive licensing scheme is one where adults must meet other qualifications
before they can acquire the credentials to purchase heroin. (Drivers’ licenses include a
positive element, in that applicants for such licenses generally must pass road tests,
written tests on the traffic law, and vision tests.) In the case of heroin, adults might have
to pass an exam indicating that they understand the dangers of its use. As with negative
licenses, positive licenses could be revoked for misbehavior, in the same manner in which
drivers’ licenses are revoked. A positive licensing scheme involving a test of knowledge
of the dangers of drugs is, I believe, consistent with the robustness and harm principles:
as Mill notes with respect to a requirement to label poisons, “the buyer cannot wish not to
know that the thing that he possesses has poisonous qualities.”74 But a sane adult who
understands the risk of heroin cannot be prevented from using it, as “liberty consists in
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doing what one desires,” and “...no one but the person himself can judge of the
sufficiency of the motive which may prompt him to incur the risk....”75 So under the
robustness principle, adults could face a positive licensing scheme, where to receive the
right to purchase limited quantities of heroin they would have to pass a test concerning
the risks of heroin use and perhaps the laws surrounding heroin use, and their license
would be subject to revocation if they harmed others through their heroin-related
activity.76
One advantage of a licensing scheme for heroin is that private responses could
help keep the costs of heroin misuse low.77 Employees in sensitive positions might face
the absence of a heroin license as a job requirement. Insurance companies might offer
lower rates to policy holders who opt to forego a heroin license. There is even precedent
of sorts – Thomas De Quincey, nineteenth century author of Confessions of an English
Opium Eater, expressed great dismay at the unwillingness of life insurers to grant him a
policy because of his opium habit.78
Abiding by the robustness principle does not imply that private sellers need be
countenanced. Heroin could be distributed only through state stores, for instance, and as
noted, an advance purchase requirement could be imposed. Advertising could be banned,
and the heroin could be subject to a substantial (though not prohibitive) tax.79 It might be
sensible not to make taxes so high that the incentive to evade the taxes spawns a
flourishing black market. Presumably the advantages of receiving heroin of a known
purity would make black market heroin a very imperfect substitute for the legal supply.
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As a result, heroin taxes could probably be quite significant, as excise taxes often are for
alcohol or tobacco, without generating massive underground sales.80
License holders could be given the option to precommit not to purchase any
heroin for a period of time, say, one week or even one day, in a binding way. That is, the
government could provide a mechanism to help people voluntarily manage the self-
control problem that is an obstacle for many people with drugs or alcohol or cigarettes. In
moments when their cravings are not intense, individuals might choose to limit their
possibilities for future (legal) consumption for a few days, even if they are unwilling to
forestall those possibilities indefinitely by relinquishing their license. (Such opt-outs are
not uncommon in the regulation of gambling.) Or, they could choose a license that
permits them some heroin, but an amount less than the legal quantity limit. Taxes could
be repositioned from being ad valorem or specific to consisting of a single, annual license
fee.81
With the robustness principle as the basis of drug policy, therefore, a very
restrictive regime over heroin could be implemented. Kids could be forbidden from
acquiring drugs, and adults could be required to be licensed before purchasing limited
amounts of heroin. Commercial sales and advertising could be prohibited, and significant
sin taxes could be imposed. But adults who wanted to acquire heroin, and whose past use
had not resulted in any wrongful conduct, would have a safe and legal means to do so.
Alternatively, an extremely liberal policy towards addictive goods such as heroin
would not be countenanced under the robustness principle. (This is opposed to the
situation with the harm principle, under which laissez faire would be a consistent policy.)
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The requirement that public policy lead to tolerable results in the face of significant
departures from rationality suggests the necessity of aiding actual and potential addicts
with their self-control. Licensing, taxation, and advance purchase requirements for some
addictive goods, then, might be near-requirements imposed by the robustness principle,
and not just consistent with it. Information provision about addiction treatment options
(such as now occurs in the form of phone numbers for Gamblers Anonymous printed on
lottery tickets) and even publicly subsidized access to treatment are other policies that
might be necessary to reduce the harms suffered by less-than-rational users.
6. Conclusions
The chief alternative to framing the discussion of vice policy in terms of stated
principles is to rely upon expedience. In the US in recent decades, that approach has
generally meant that perceived new drug threats are met by an enhanced version of the
current prohibition: more severe penalties, additions to the list of controlled substances, a
widening of the prohibition to encompass precursors, paraphernalia, or devices to
confound drug tests. With expedience as our guide, the problems that arise under
prohibition transmute into arguments for a more intense or broader prohibition.82
While expedience seems to be the current driver of much drug policy, at some
point, prohibition was a choice made from a wider set of available policies. (That point in
the US was 1914 for opiates and cocaine and 1937 for marijuana.) The principle
underlying this choice (and underlying current defenses of prohibition) seems to be that
drugs are tempting but harmful. Of course, the syllogism “drugs are bad, therefore they
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must be prohibited” is as logically unsound as it has turned out to be destructive in
practice. Nevertheless, prohibition proponents are correct that some drugs are highly
problematic. The challenge posed by John Kaplan – “Probably the central problem with
the solution [to our drug predicament] of legalization is that it ignores basic
pharmacology. There is such a thing as a dangerous drug...”83 – cannot simply be
dismissed. Resistance to the generally appealing harm principle tends to come in the form
of Mill’s near-dismissal (in terms of public policy) of the problem of dangerous drugs
and the harms that such drugs bring upon their adult users.
The robustness principle is not similarly dismissive. It accepts that some drugs are
dangerous, and that public policy should aim, in part, to reduce the damage that drugs
wreak upon their users. But it does so while also recognizing limits to the harm that the
policies themselves can impose upon rational drug consumers. Prohibition of drug
possession is not compatible with the robustness principle, though many strict controls
are compatible. What the robustness principle demonstrates is that acceptance of those
strict controls does not imply that the only governing principle is the logic of persecutors;
drugs can be strictly controlled without opening the door to prohibitions upon opera, or
billiards – or drugs.
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